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ABSTRACT 
In response to the Global War on Terror data communication demands, Navy 
commands acquired COTS C4I Tactical Data Link equipment outside standard 
acquisition practices. This thesis analyzes the circumstance of the non-standard 
acquisition and fielding of COTS Data Link equipment impact upon similar capability 
Programs of Record using a case study of the Navy’s acquisition of the Air Defense 
System Integrator (ADSI). Additionally, this thesis analyzes practices and philosophies 
that could be implemented to prevent future occurrences.  
Despite years of reform, DoD acquisition system does not field capabilities 
quickly enough to meet warfighter requirements.  DoD acquisition can not keep pace 
with the rate of C4I technology growth and is encumbered by layers of procedural 
bureaucracy.  Subsequently existing Programs of Record were harmed by the resulting 
non-standard acquisitions. 
More reform is neither necessary nor the panacea.  Adequate processes and 
programs exist to expedite the fielding of new capabilities.  Optimization of existing 
processes and programs combined with greater warfighter involvement are necessary to 
prevent future occurrences of non-standard acquisition.   
Adherence to existing rules and regulations when combined with reduction of 
bureaucracy will reduce future occurrences of non-standard COTS C4I equipment 
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In order to meet the complex, asymmetrical and non-traditional threats of the 
twenty-first century, today's warfighter requires an extensive array of capabilities.  The 
most critical of these capabilities are the Command, Control, Communications, 
Computers and Intelligence (C4I) systems. C4I systems allow the commander to make 
usable the varied and voluminous information and data permeating the battle space. 
Technical innovations and advances in the information technology and computing 
sectors are the prime drivers in the evolution of information communications.  The rate of 
technology change; both in capability (rising) and cost (falling), is staggering and 
significantly impacts the Navy’s acquisition of C4I systems. Keeping pace with 
technology; technology refresh, is difficult.  It is challenging in the private sector and 
even more so in the Department of Defense (DoD).  DoD acquisition is attempting to 
keep pace with the warfighter’s demand for more capability sooner through acquisition 
reform. 
The DoD acquisition system is guided by directives, regulations and rules.  
Effecting change in such a process-specific and physically large enterprise is difficult. 
None-the-less, DoD acquisition has been "reforming" for well over thirty years with the 
goal of providing the warfighter "what he needs when he needs it."  Despite years of 
reform initiates, such as evolutionary and spiral acquisition, and the JCIDS process, the 
warfighter still bemoans the slowness in fielding C4I systems.  Some, citing the exegeses 
of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), have gone so far as to acquire commercial-of-
the-shelf (COTS) C4I systems in lieu of waiting on formal acquisition channels to deliver 
requested capabilities.  Such was the case with the Navy's fielding of the Air Defense 
System Integrator (ADSI) to meet the global war on terror (GWOT) driven warfighter 
tactical data link (TDL) needs. 
TDLs provide the bridge or pathway for equipped units to exchange tactical 
information.  TDLs allow participating units to share tactical information such as their 
own position, location of friendly forces, enemy positions, threats and warnings, 
 xix
command and control instructions, and force orders (to name a few) in real-time.  The 
synergy from this information exchange ensures that each participant, including higher 
headquarters and command elements, share a common tactical operational picture 
(CTOP) which translates into efficient and coordinated use of forces.   
The GWOT changed how battle groups deploy.  Many ships, particularly large 
deck and command ships, were not equipped to handle the new TDL demands.   Requests 
for assistance started pouring in with the commencement of Operation Enduring Freedom 
(OEF).  The Link 16 communication demands varied depending upon a ship's mission 
and existing TDL capability configuration.  The new TDL requirements fell into two 
categories: add beyond line-of-sight Link 16 capability and remotely display Link 16 
information for the Battle Group staff. 
The Fleet articulated their needs up their chain of command and the 
requests were forward to the Navy's tactical data link acquisition program office.  The 
program office concluded it did not have a program of record (POR) that would provide 
the requested capabilities within the desired time frame.  Having no other option, 
individual units purchased ADSIs directly from the manufacturer, outside standard 
acquisition.  The ADSIs success resulted in the program office's fielding, at OPNAV's 
direction, 30 ADSIs.  Supporting the 30 ADSIs significantly impacted existing PORs.  
Resource to field the ADSI would have to come from existing PORs.  The reallocation of 
POR resources retarded existing and future PORs.  
In addition to the impact on corresponding PORs, analysis of the cause and 
consequences of the non-standard C4I COTS acquisition revealed that non-standard 
acquisitions is not completely preventable.  In spite reform programs such as JCTDs, 
WRAPs, and the JRAC, acquisition continues to be layers of regulations and volumes of 
directives that perpetuate bureaucratic delays.   
If DoD's acquisition goal is to provide the warfighter "what he needs when he 
needs it," then it must field C4I capabilities quicker by optimizing existing regulations 
and directives that guide the process and fostering greater warfighter/operator 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. BACKGROUND 
Sea Power 21 is the Navy’s “strategy that will fully integrate U.S. naval forces 
into joint operations against regional and transnational dangers" (Bucchi and Mullen, 
2002).  In describing his vision of Sea Power 21, Chief of Naval Operations Admiral 
Vern Clark stated, “Future naval operations will use revolutionary information 
superiority and dispersed, networked force capabilities to deliver unprecedented offensive 
power, defensive assurance, and operational independence to Joint Force Commanders
(Clark, 2002)."  That future is upon us.   
Given the complex nature of today’s asymmetrical and non-traditional threats, the 
warfighter requires an extensive array of capabilities.  The most critical of these 
capabilities are the Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence 
(C4I) systems.  C4I systems allow the commander to make usable the varied and 
voluminous information or data permeating the battles space.  C4I systems are the key 
enablers of ForceNet, the 'glue' that binds the three tiers of Sea Power 21: Sea Strike, Sea 
Shield, and Sea Basing. ForceNet “is the operational construct and architectural 
framework for naval warfare in the information age, integrating warriors, sensors, 
command and control, platforms, and weapons into a networked, distributed combat force 
(Commercial Technology Transition Officer, 2006)." 
Technical innovations and advances in the information technology and computing 
sectors are the prime drivers in the evolution of information communications.  The 
exponential growth rate in the number of transistors in a computer chip, postulated in 
1965 by Fairchild Semiconductor’s Gordon E. Moore, Moore’s Law, fairly represents the 
rate or degree of advance in information communications (Jorgenson 2002).  The rate of 
technology change; both in capability (rising) and cost (falling), is staggering and 
significantly impacts the Navy’s acquisition of C4I systems. 
Keeping pace with technology and technology refresh, is difficult.  It is 
challenging in the private sector and even more so in the Department of Defense (DoD).  
That being said, DoD acquisition regulations have tried to keep pace with the 
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warfighter’s demand for more capability sooner.  DoD acquisition reform is active, but 
the warfighter still bemoans the slowness in fielding C4I systems.  Some, citing the 
urgency of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), have gone so far as to acquire 
comparable available commercial-of-the-shelf (COTS) systems in lieu of waiting on 
formal acquisition channels, particularly in the area of C4I.   
This thesis examines the impact and consequences of non-standard COTS C4I 
systems’ acquisition on associated programs of record (POR), using the acquisition of the 
Air Defense System Integrator (ADSI) as a case study.  
B. RESEARCH OBJECTIVE 
The objective of this research is to analyze both the circumstance under which 
and the consequences of non-standard C4I acquisition and fielding of COTS C4I 
equipments and the impact upon similar capability Programs of Record using a case  
study of the Navy’s acquisition of the ADSI.  Additionally, it will analyze the practices, 
methodologies, and philosophies that could be implemented to prevent future 
occurrences. Analysis will yield lessons that may be helpful to system engineers, 
acquisition managers and students studying acquisition. 
C.  RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Primary Research Questions 
What are the causes, impacts, and consequences of non-standard COTS C4I 
acquisitions and what strategies or procedures can improve them? 
2. Subsidiary Research Questions 
What mechanism does the Fleet use to articulate their C4I needs to the acquisition 
program offices? 
How are emerging COTS C4I systems brought to the attention of relevant 
acquisition program offices? 
What is the relationship between industry, program sponsors, and C4I system 
acquisition program offices with respect to emerging technologies and current programs 
with similar capabilities? 
3 
How are COTS C4I systems able to be fielded outside existing acquisition rules? 
What strategy must be developed to prevent future occurrences? 
D. SCOPE 
The scope of this thesis includes the independent description of the non-standard 
acquisition of C4I systems; circumstances that resulted in the non-standard acquisition; 
financial and programmatic consequences of the non-standard acquisition; the major 
tenants, challenges, and benefits of standard acquisition; and recommendations to prevent 
future negative occurrences. 
E.  METHODOLOGY  
The methodology used in this thesis consisted of the following steps.  
• Conducted comprehensive interviews in person, or by telephone, with the 
Program Manager Warfare 150 (PMW 150), ADSI Assistant Program 
Manager, OPNAV, and industry personnel involved in the development of 
non-standard acquisition issues.   
• Conducted a comprehensive analysis of the information gathered with 
respect to the non-standard acquisition of the COTS C4I system and their 
impact upon the program manager. 
• Synthesized analysis with business and readiness considerations to depict 
the results to date of the non-standard acquisition and recommend future 
actions. 
F.  ORGANIZATION 
This thesis consists of six chapters: an introduction, three developmental chapters, 
an analysis chapter, and a conclusion and recommendation chapter and is illustrated in 
Figure 1.  Chapter I is an introduction.  Chapter II is a review of standard Navy C4I 
acquisition methodologies with respect to emerging technologies. Chapter III describes 
the influences that precipitated the non-standard acquisition of a COTS C4I system.  
Chapter IV identifies the major impacts of non-standard acquisition COTS C4I systems 
on the war fighter, existing POR, future POR and the associated organizational and 
cultural challenges.  Chapter V is an analysis of the proposal to prevent reoccurrence and 
potential application to other C4I programs.  Chapter VI presents the conclusions and 
recommendations. 
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Figure 1.   Thesis organization 
 
 
G. BENEFITS OF RESEARCH 
This thesis will provide C4I system engineers and program mangers with an 
understanding of how non-standard C4I acquisition could occur and actions that could 
help recognize and mitigate improper acquisition while concurrently incorporating COTS 
systems into their acquisition strategy. 
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II.  STANDARD C4I SYSTEM ACQUISITION  
A.  BACKGROUND 
In order to maintain our fighting forces and update their warfighting capabilities, 
the DoD is constantly fielding new systems and capabilities.  Bringing these new systems 
and capabilities to the warfighter is the responsibility of the DoD Acquisition force. 
Webster's Third New International Dictionary defines acquisition "to come to have as a 
new or added characteristic, trait, or ability (Webster, 2002)."  That is a rather terse 
definition for an extremely complex process.  
In order to appreciate the unique aspects of C4I system acquisition one must first 
understand the fundamentals of DoD acquisition.  DoD Directive 5000.1 defines the 
Defense Acquisition System as "the management process by which the Department of 
Defense provides effective, affordable, and timely systems to the users (DoD, 2003)."  
DoD Instruction 5000.2 "establishes a simplified and flexible management framework for 
translating mission needs and technology opportunities, based on approved mission needs 
and requirements, into stable, affordable, and well-managed acquisition programs that 
include weapon systems and automated information systems (AISs) (DoD, 2003)."  The 
Defense Acquisition Guidebook adds substantively to the definition stating "the Defense 
Acquisition System exists to manage the Nation's investments in technologies, programs, 
and product support necessary to achieve the National Security Strategy and support the 
United States Armed Forces (DAG, 2004)."  Examination of the three previous 
statements illustrates the complex and intertwined relationships among technology, 
products and cost involved in DoD acquisition.  To deal with these complexities DoD 
developed a decision support system for acquiring materiel and services.  
DoD's integrated decision support system is comprised of three inter-related 
decision-making systems/process: the previously mentioned Defense Acquisition System, 
the Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution (PPBE) process, and the Joint 
Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS).  The three systems represent 
three different stakeholders: the Defense Acquisition System – Milestone Decision 
Authority, PPBE – Deputy Secretary of Defense, and JCIDS – Vice Chairman of Joint 
6 
Chiefs of Staff/Joint Requirements Oversight Council ensuring their respective priorities 




Figure 2.   DoD Decision Support System  (From DAG, 2004) 
 
1. Defense Acquisition System 
The Defense Acquisition System (DAS) is the management process by which 
DoD acquires weapon systems and automated information systems (AIS).  The DoD 
5000 series defines the DAS; DoD Directive 5000.1 provides the policies and principles 
that govern the defense acquisition system and DoD Instruction 5000.2 establishes the 
management framework that implements these policies and principles.  
The DAS management framework provides an event-based process where 
acquisition programs precede through a series of milestones associated with significant 
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program phases (DAG, 2004).  In essence the DAS evaluates JCIDS defined capability 
gaps, and initiates and executes acquisition and procurement programs to field systems to 
bridge these gaps. The DAS process divides the project lifecycle into three general 
stages: pre-systems acquisition, systems acquisition, and sustainment. These three stages 
are further divided into five distinct sub-phases: Concept Refinement (CR), Technology 
Development (TD), System Development and Demonstration (SDD), Production and 
Deployment (P&D), and Operations and Support (O&S).  Figure 3 illustrates the Defense 




Figure 3.   Defense Acquisition Management Framework (From DoD 
5000.2, 2003) 
 
2. Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution Process  
The Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution (PPBE) process allocates 
resources within DoD to meet the requirements of National Security Strategy while 
providing a vehicle for decision makers to examine and analyze decisions by taking into 
consideration influencing environmental factors such as threats, political and economic 
climates, technological developments, and resource availability (DAG, 2004).  The goal 
of the PPBE process is to ensure the DoD acquisition system provides the warfighter the 
optimum mix of forces, equipment, and support attainable within fiscal constraints in 
8 
support of the national security strategy of the US (OSD, 2007).  The PPBE process is 
made up of four overlapping and concurrent phases; Planning, Programming, Budgeting 
and Execution, and is illustrated in Figure 4. 
 
 
Figure 4.   Typical PPBE Biennial Cycle (From DAG, 2004) 
 
a. Planning 
The planning phase is the start of the PPBE process. During this phase the 
Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) discusses planning issues with the Joint Staff. 
The product of this interaction is the Strategic Planning Guidance (SPG) which is based 
on national defense policies and military strategy.  The process follows the SPG to 
produce the Joint Programming Guidance (JPG): a fiscally constrained guidance and 
priorities for military forces, modernization, readiness and sustainability, and supporting 
business processes and infrastructure activities.  The JPG is the link between the planning 
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phase and the follow-on programming phase, and provides guidance to the military 
departments and defense agencies for the development of their program proposal - the 
Program Objective Memorandum (POM) (DAG, 2004).  
b. Programming 
The programming phase is where the programs and budgets start their 
interaction. The goal of this interaction is to achieve a balance between meeting the JPG 
priorities and adhering to the fiscal parameters.  The programming phase produces the 
POM – a detailed and comprehensive description, by each DoD component, of the 
proposed programs, including a time-phased allocation of resources (forces, funding, and 
manpower) by program projected six-year into the future (DAG, 2004).  It is also during 
this phase where DoD components identify important programs not fully funded (or not 
funded at all) in the POM, and assess the risks associated with those shortfalls.  
c. Budgeting 
The budgeting phase is an integral part of the POM process and as such is 
executed at the same time as the programming phase. This phase translates DoD 
programmatics into the format of Congressional appropriations. Whereas the 
programming phase looks at six year time slices, the budgeting phase projects resources 
for only two years into the future. The shorter timeframe results in significantly more 
financial details than the associated POM. The budget is reviewed by the offices of the 
Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) and the Office of Management and Budget 
(OMB) to ensure that programs are funded in accordance with current financial policies 
and properly and reasonably priced (DAG, 2004). 
d. Execution 
The execution phase is a review of the accuracy of the current and prior 
(two years) resource allocation effectiveness to apprise senior leadership decision-
makers.   To the extent performance goals of an existing program are not being met, the 
execution review may lead to recommendations to adjust resources and/or restructure 
programs to achieve desired performance goals (DAG, 2004). 
10 
3.   Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System   
Current and future military challenges will require action by joint forces.  Fielding 
the proper weapon system and capabilities requires funding and coordination across 
services and agencies.  Unlike the bottom-up approach of its predecessor, the 
Requirement Generation System (RGS), the Joint Capabilities Integration and 
Development System (JCIDS) is a top-down driven analysis of Doctrine, Organization, 
Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, and Facilities (DOTMLPF) capabilities and 
deficiencies conducted in an integrated, collaborative process (Jones and McCaffery, 
2005). The JCIDS is a joint concepts-centric, capabilities identification process that helps 
joint forces meet future military challenges (CJCS, 2005).   
Chairman of Joint Chief of Staff Instruction CJCSI 3170.01E defines the JCIDS 
process policy and procedures (CJCS, 2005).   The JCIDS provides coordination across 
the services by assisting the Joint Chiefs of Staff in assessing gaps in military joint 
warfighting capabilities and recommending solutions to resolve these gaps.  These 
solutions serve as the basis for acquisition analysis programs providing a prioritized and 
logically-sequenced delivery of capabilities to the warfighters, despite multiple sponsors 
and materiel developers (DAG, 20047).  Figure 5 illustrates the JCIDS top-down 

























Figure 5.   JCIDS top-down capability need identification process        














Figure 6.   JCIDS process and acquisition decisions (After SMC, 2005) 
 
 
The preceding discussion is a brief overview of the complicated process by which 
DoD acquisition program requirements are generated, prioritized, and funded.  The 
following section describes the two DoD acquisition strategies.    
B. ACQUISITION STRATEGIES 
 Providing the warfighter the right equipment at the right time has been a 
challenge for military acquisition since the day the first tree branch was fashioned into a 
spear.  The challenge has not diminished with time. In spite of advances in production, 
design and manufacturing, the complexity of capabilities, particularly C4I, required by 
the warfighter are such that the time to field a specific capability (acquisition response 
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time) is taking longer than the rate of technology growth.  Figure 7 elucidates the impact 































































“… today, it takes twice as long as it did in 




Figure 7.   Acquisition Response Time (From Farkas and Thurston, 2002) 
 
DOD 5000.2 lists two acquisition strategies for acquiring new weapon systems: 
single-step and evolutionary acquisition.  The strategy used depends upon urgency of 
requirements, maturity of key technologies, and cost and benefit analysis between single-
step and evolutionary.  
1.  Single-step 
Single-step acquisition is commonly referred to as 'traditional acquisition' where a 
new capability is delivered in a single-step irrespective of the design challenges or 
technical maturity necessary, and only after all requirement thresholds have been met.  

















Figure 8.   Single-Step Acquisition (From Burns, 2003) 
 
A single-step acquisition program normally includes a variety of technologies 
(low-risk and high-risk) in order to achieve the weapon systems' full capability.  This 
requires managing certain high-risk technology items, resulting in longer development 
timelines and the added likelihood of schedule slips (Burns, 2003).  Historical averages 
for single-step program fielding are on the order of 11-15 years (GAO, 2002). These long 
development cycles often resulted in the fielding of a technologically-obsolete system.  
With very few exceptions (e.g., new ship construction), single-step acquisition strategy 
does not satisfy the war fighters' acquisition time line.    
2. Evolutionary Acquisition 
DoD acquisition has been transforming for the past 25 years.  However, the 
turning of the 21st century has brought about some of the more significant changes in how 
DoD acquisition meets warfighter needs.  In late 2002, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul 
Wolfowitz canceled the existing set of DOD 5000 series acquisition regulations because 
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they were "not being flexible, creative or efficient enough to meet the needs of the DOD 
(Jones and McCaffery, 2005)."  Secretary Wolfowitz ordered a revision of the acquisition 
process and a reissue of the directives to, “rapidly deliver affordable, sustainable 
capability to the warfighter that meets the warfighter’s needs (Jones and McCaffery, 
2005)."  His sentiments echoed those of Mr. Aldridge, USD AT&L, who in October of 
2001 lauded evolutionary acquisition as "the means to get new capabilities to the 
warfighter even faster, field new systems with some but not all of the their ultimate 
features and adding new technologies in block upgrades as they become available 

















Figure 9.   Evolutionary Acquisition (From Burns, 2003) 
 
Secretary Wolfowitz issued new guidance, the result of which was the adoption, 
per DoD 5000.2, of the evolutionary acquisition (EA) strategy as the preferred DoD 
acquisition strategy.  
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Evolutionary acquisition is the preferred DoD strategy for rapid 
acquisition of mature technology for the user. An evolutionary approach 
delivers capability in increments, recognizing, up-front, the need for future 
capability improvements. The objective is to balance needs and available 
capability with resources, and to put capability into the hands of the user 
quickly.  The success of the strategy depends on consistent and continuous 
definition of requirements, and the maturation of technologies that lead to 
disciplined development and production of systems that provide increasing 
capability towards a materiel concept (5000.2, 2003).  
Communication is vital to successful evolutionary acquisition strategy. 
Collaboration between user, developer, and tester ensures the right capability gets fielded.  
Two processes support the evolutionary acquisition strategy: incremental and spiral 
development.   
a.  Incremental Development 
 DoD 5000.2 defines incremental development as a process used when a 
"desired capability is identified, an end-state requirement is known, and that requirement 
is met over time by developing several increments, each dependent on available mature 
technology (2003)."  Unlike single-step acquisition where a capability is fielded only 
after all requirements have been met, incremental development allows the fielding of 
capabilities in blocks (increments) as they become available.  It is easy to visualize each 
increment as a single-step acquisition.  Because each increment delivers a specific set of 
capabilities, it must be managed as a unique acquisition having approved operational 
requirements, an interoperability key performance parameter (KPP), performance, cost, 
and schedule goals, testing, and compliance with acquisition oversight requirements as 





Figure 10.   Incremental Development Time Line (From Burns,  2003) 
 
b. Spiral Development 
Spiral development is the iterative process by which a capability is 
developed or matured within an increment.  Typically the "desired capability is 
identified, but end-state requirements are not known at program initiation.  Requirements 
for future increments are dependent upon technology maturation and user feedback from 
the preceding increment (DoD 5000.2, 2003).  The iterative nature of spirals provides a 
continuous feedback within the increment ensuring that the desired capability is fielded.  





Figure 11.   Spiral Development Process (From Burns, 2003) 
 
Acquisition reform brought improvement to the requirements generation 
process and capability fielding.  Figure 12 illustrates the relationship between the JCIDS 
requirements generation and evolutionary acquisition. 
 
Figure 12.   JCIDS Requirements and Process Depiction (From 5000.2, 2003) 
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C. RELATIONSHIP WITH EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES 
Time-to-fielding has been the biggest hindrance to acquisition reform.  The 
preceding section described the requirements and challenges that influence the current 
DoD acquisition process.  Despite the continuing efforts to reform and improve the time-
to-field the warfighters are not getting what they need when they need it (Sylvester and 
Ferrara, 2003).  This situation is most prevalent in the fielding of emerging technologies, 
particularly in the area of C4I systems.    
Transitioning emerging technology to an acquisition programs is difficult (Farr, 
Johnson and Birmingham, 2005).  In an effort to field technology sooner the DoD has 
numerous programs to determine if an emerging technology is mature enough and 
militarily useful for DoD acquisition programs.   Though not all inclusive, the following 
programs are of particular interest to this thesis. 
1.  Advance Technology Demonstrations 
Advanced Technology Demonstrations (ATD) are conducted to determine if a 
proposed technology is mature enough to be considered for use by DoD.   ATDs bring 
together interested stakeholders from the, industry, and the science and technology and 
the research and development fields.  The subsequent collaboration helps weed-out 
unsuited or unattainable technologies, thereby focusing on potential candidates and is 
illustrated in Figure 13. ATDs are conducted at the Service and DoD agency level using 
internal funding (DAU, 2005). 
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Figure 13.   Advance Technology Demonstration Process                       
(From ASTMP, 1997) 
 
2. Future Naval Capabilities 
The Navy does not have ATDs per se but rather Future Naval Capabilities (FNC) 
which are essentially equivalent.  "The FNC program is composed of Enabling 
Capabilities (ECs) which develop and deliver quantifiable products in response to 
validated requirements for insertion into acquisition programs of record after meeting 
agreed upon exit criteria within five years (Blumenthal, 2007)."  The enabling concepts 
are aligned along the four pillars of Naval Power 21 that were discussed in chapter one. 
FNCs bring the science and technology (S&T) community into a partnership with the 
fleet and acquisition community to focus upon transitioning technology to the warfighter. 
3. Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations   
The Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations (ACTD) program is an 
extension of sorts of the ATD program.  Whereas the ATD looks at maturing a 
technology for DoD use, an ACTD assesses the feasibility of integrating existing 
technology into DoD programs.  The idea being to let actual operators use and evaluated 
the military utility a prototype capability in an operational, albeit demonstration, 
environment and is illustrated in Figure 14.  Another goal of an ACTD is to help develop 
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concepts of operations (CONOPS) for the new capability.  If the ACTD is successful the 
demonstrated capability may be 'left in place' for the warfighter to use resulting in greater 
capability sooner (DAU, 2005).   
 
 
Figure 14.   Advanced Capability Technology Demonstrations Selection 
Process (ASTMP) 
 
In order to keep pace with DoD acquisition reform and the JCIDS requirement 
process, the ACTD program is in the process of transforming into a joint program - Joint 
Capability Technology Demonstrations (JCTD).  The transformation began in 2006 and 
is expected to be completed within three-to-five years. The primary goal of this 
transformation is to give the Combatant Commanders (COCOMs) promising 
technologies sooner by "rapidly placing relevant, mature technology into the hands of 
joint and coalition warfighters (Peterson, 2005)."  
4. Warfighters Rapid Acquisition Program 
The Warfighters Rapid Acquisition Program (WRAP) was established by the 
Army (and is also used by the Air Force) to shorten the acquisition cycle and be a bridge 
between experimentation and systems acquisition by addressing the gap in funding that 
exists because of the time required to plan, program, budget, and receive appropriations 
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for procuring a new technology (AT&L, 2003).   In other words "the WRAP exists to 
speed proven innovations into official development programs in a fraction of the time 
that the PPBE process normally takes (AT&L, 2007).  The goal of the WRAP is to put 
new weapons in the hands of soldiers faster and cheaper. 
5. Rapid Deployment Capability 
The Rapid Deployment Capability (RDC) process is a Navy-specific pre-
acquisition effort that enables Navy acquisition to react immediately to a newly-
discovered enemy threat(s) or potential enemy threat(s) or to respond to significant and 
urgent safety situations through special, tailored procedures.  If successful, RDCs may 
transition to Navy Programs of Record (POR) (SECNAV, 2004).  
6. Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell 
The above mentioned processes and programs have one overarching goal – 
decrease the time required to field a desired capability.  Progress is being made but the 
Global War on Terror (GWOT) has added a renewed sense of urgency to DoD 
acquisition.  In spite of our best acquisition efforts the COCOMs' find themselves facing 
an ever-changing and evolving enemy.   
When a COCOM has an urgent operational need, which, if left unfilled, would 
seriously endanger personnel or pose a major threat, which can not be met through 
normal acquisition process, he issues a Joint Urgent Operational Need (JUON).  If the 
JUON's solution is required immediately (between 120 days and two years), it becomes 
an Immediate Warfighting Need (IWN) which is then forwarded to the Joint Rapid 
Acquisition Cell (JRAC) for resolution (Buhrkuhl, 2006).  The JRAC is an Office of the 
Secretary of Defense (OSD) lead effort designed to "break down institutional barriers to 
timely and effective Warfighting support (DSD, 2004)."    The COCOMs drive the JRAC 
process that monitors, coordinates, and facilitates meeting Combatant Commanders’ 
IWN (Sheehan, 1997). 
Maintaining a well equipped and technologically superior fighting force is a 
daunting task.  The DoD acquisition system is the process by which the warfighters needs 
are articulated, validated resources and procured.  Even after 30 years of reform, DoD 
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acquisition is struggling to keep pace with warfighter requirements.  The numerous 
processes cited above are testimony to the acquisition system desire to provide the 
warfighter what he needs when he needs it.   
In spite of the numerous paths to rapid acquisition, some capabilities are being 
fielded outside of formal acquisition channels.  Although they seem to satisfy an urgent 
warfighter needs, these ‘non-standard’ acquisitions impact the fielding of current and 







































III. NON-STANDARD ACQUISITION OF COTS C4I SYSTEMS   
A. BACKGROUND 
Every major war and armed conflict introduces new tactics and weapons.  Some 
are the results of lessons learned while others the product of industrious minds.  The 
'guerilla' tactics of the American Revolutionary Army, the German V-1 rockets and the 
'smart' bombs of Operation Dessert Storm are examples from a very long list.  All of 
these share a common theme, "Mater artium necessitas" - "necessity is the mother of 
invention (Artium, 2007)."  This phrase takes on monumental significance when 
attributed to DoD C4I acquisition. 
Unlike other acquisition efforts where 'necessity' is normally the impetus to the 
'invention,' C4I acquisition is driven equally by necessity and invention.  An example of 
the first would be the need for greater ship speed necessitating development of better 
propulsion systems. An example of the latter case would be the need for greater 
communication bandwidth during a time of data throughput technology growth: the two 
occurring coincidentally and independent of each other.  The invention and necessity 
duality is most prevalent in C4I systems because of the relative 'youth' of the field and the 
astronomical growth and advances (re: Moore's law) in computing power.  And it is these 
very attributes that make non-standard C4I COTS acquisition so tempting. 
Acquisition reform is an iterative process without a definitive end state.  Despite 
30 years of reform, restructuring, and process and procedural changes, DoD acquisition 
remains slow to meet warfighter needs.  That unto itself is not new, but rather a 
continuation of the status quo.  Warfighters of today sit in their tents, reminiscent of their 
Civil War predecessors, decrying their leadership for the want of better weapons.  There 
will always be something better, newer, or more capable, particularly in the area C4I 
technology, but it is unrealistic to expect an apparatus such as DoD acquisition to field 
such capabilities in near-real-time.  Regardless of the urgency or speed of effort, large 
scale acquisition takes time.  It takes time to make sure it is the right capability and that 
sufficient funds are allocated for procurement.  It also takes time to test, evaluate, and 
field.   
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In most circumstances, the warfighter understands these realities, but when it 
comes to fielding C4I capabilities, that understanding quickly disappears.  It easy to 
appreciate the time required to design and build a new armored transport vehicle.  The 
warfighter ‘gets it,’ he understands the material reality.  That understanding falls apart 
when the capability is C4I-related.  Unlike armored transports, which are extremely DoD-
specific, communication gear, especially the technically-advanced, is seemingly 
commonplace.  It is that commonness, that appearance of ease, which challenges C4I 
acquisition.  It is in cases where that perceived ease is applied to combat needs, that the 
situation is ripe for non-standard acquisition.      
1. Operation Desert Storm 
Operation Desert Storm defined the notion of modern warfare.  Despite being 
6000 miles away, Americans (and the world) watched the war in their living rooms.  
Technology made that possible.  Satellite communication, cable television, and the World 
Wide Web brought the sights and sounds of near-real-time war into peoples' daily lives 
(Hallin, 1991).  
Technology drove the war. Streaming video from unmanned aerial vehicles 
(UAV), overhead imagery, and real-time beyond-line-of-sight (BLOS) tactical 
communication provided commanders unprecedented battlefield intelligence.  Laser-
guided and precision 'smart bombs' were launch hundreds of miles from their targets, 
striking feet, if not inches, from their aim point.   Operation Desert Storm was a proving 
ground for the latest technologies and a demonstration of warfighter ingenuity (Hallion, 
1991). 
Unlike the battle fields of Southeast Asia, the deserts of the Middle East are 
essentially featureless expanses that make navigation extremely challenging.  Although 
not completely fielded, the Air Force's Global Positioning System (GPS) proved to be the 
lynch-pin to coordinated maneuver warfare success during Operation Desert Storm.  
These relatively inexpensive hand-held navigation systems provided the warfighter 
unprecedented location and navigation information.  Commercial GPS units were 
purchased off-the-shelf by the thousands to outfit tanks and other mechanized vehicles.  It 
was with these hand-held GPS systems that we first saw technology-driven non-standard 
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acquisition on a large scale: "GPS receivers were attached, in some cases with tape, to 
vehicles and helicopter instrument panels and were also used in F-16 fighters, KC-135 
tankers, and B-52 bombers (Pace, 1995)." Need, affordability, and ease of use allowed 
the warfighter to literally buy the units off-the-shelf for immediate use. 
2. Global War on Terror 
The attacks of September 11, 2001, changed the world.  The subsequent GWOT 
redefined the concept of 'war.'   The enemy is everywhere and nowhere, state-sponsored 
and independent, reviled by many and adored by others.   Conventional methods and 
mindsets would have to adapt to the new threat.  Unlike the earlier 'desert war,' the 
GWOT was anything but Desert Storm II. 
Where Desert Storm had defined geography and enemy order-of-battle, the 
GWOT barely has either.  Where Desert Storm had planning and preparation, the GWOT 
was initially a reaction that has become more refined, but still lacks a definitive end-state 
or clear objectives.  Where the US had the clear technological edge over an antiquated, 
ill-equipped and poorly-led opponent in Desert Storm, today's enemy is using the most 
advanced technologies available. Numerous joint task forces (JTFs) are expending 
hundreds of millions of dollars and thousands of man hours to develop tactics and 
technologies to defeat the enemy threats.   
The task of establishing and maintaining tactical superiority over the enemy is the 
hardest in US combat history.  Many factors contribute to that challenge.  Benevolent 
allies, coupled with unprecedented access to information, technology, and readily-
available weapons, make it easy for the enemy to field a technologically-advanced and 
capable fighting force.  Countering those threats has put a tremendous strain on the DoD 
acquisition system and, to its credit, DoD acquisition is making tremendous strides with 
the unprecedented speed to field systems to counter the emerging threats.  The 
previously-mentioned JRAC process and ACTDs are good examples.  Yet in spite of 
these rapid fielding programs, non-standard C4I acquisition occurs by using the urgencies 
of the GWOT as rationale.  
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3.  Tactical Data Links  
Prior to his squadron engaging the French off the Cape of Trafalgar, Admiral 
Nelson's captains knew his campaign strategy.  Anticipating communication (visual and 
aural) would be nearly impossible once action began; Nelson brought his Captains 
together and briefed his strategy.  He made sure his Captains had all relevant information 
as to how the campaign would be waged - that they had good situational awareness (SA).   
Situational awareness, or "SA" as the warfighters prefer to say, is critical to mission 
success.  Formally defined, SA is "the perception of the elements in the environment 
within a volume of time and space, the comprehension of their meaning, and the 
projection of their status in the near future (Endsley, 1996)".  In combat-speak SA is 
'knowing what's going on around you.'    
Due to the evolving complexity of warfare and the capabilities used in its 
execution, establishing and maintaining SA has become extremely difficult.  Briefing a 
few ship commanding officers as Nelson did, or using semaphore of Nimitz's WWII, or 
employing the line-of-sight voice nets of Viet Nam, would be insufficient in executing 
the GWOT.   The threat sector is 360 degrees.  Timely and accurate tactical information 
is the SA fuel that feeds the warfighters, allies, and commanders spread across the globe.  
C4I systems provide the data path, without which actionable SA does not exist.  
Prominent among these systems are tactical data links (TDLs).   
TDLs provide the bridge or pathway for equipped units to exchange tactical 
information.  TDLs allow participating units to share tactical information such as their 
own position, location of friendly forces, enemy positions, threats and warnings, 
command and control instructions, and force orders (to name a few) in real-time.  The 
synergy from this information exchange ensures that each participant, including higher 
headquarters and command elements, share a common tactical operational picture 
(CTOP) which translates into efficient and coordinated use of forces.   
Link 16 is the DoD's primary TDL.  Link 16 is a time division multiple access 
(TDMA)-based, secure, jam-resistant, and high-speed network that operates over-the-air 
in the UHF spectrum (PEO C4I, 2004).  Link 16 data, called messages, are exchanged via 
line-of-sight or beyond line-of-sight using Link 16-equipped airborne relays or satellites.  
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Link 16 messages are exchanged among a group of participating units known as 
networks.  Depending upon the geographical layout and distribution of forces, a given 
Area of Responsibility (AOR) may have multiple Link 16 networks running concurrently.   
Figure 15 illustrates the data exchange of a typical Link 16 TDL network.   
 
 
Figure 15.   Typical Link 16 Network (From PEO C4I, 2004) 
 
B. THE NEED  
Fielding a new capability is a challenge and fielding a C4I capability even more 
so.   Due to comparatively lengthy fielding time, when compared to the rate of 
technology growth, it is difficult to field a technologically-current C4I capability - even 
using spiral acquisition.  As difficult, if not more so, is bringing a new capability, as 
either a technology refreshment or an entirely new capability, to a deployed ship.   
The GWOT communication demands are tremendous, particularly in the field of 
data links.  These unprecedented demands are the product of an increase in the number of 
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TDL-capable platforms and information exchange requirements (IER).  In other words, 
more information is available and more people want access to it.   
Prior to 11 September 2001, a deployed Battle Group's (BG) primary focus was 
satisfying its (AOR) commander.  For the Pacific Fleet, this responsibility started with 
Commander Third Fleet (C3F) and shifted across the pacific as the BG moved westward 
to Commander Seventh Fleet (C7F) and finally to Commander Fifth Fleet (C5F) in the 
Persian Gulf AOR.  However, unlike in the past, where TDL data dissemination was 
limited to a particular battle group in one AOR, today's information demands are such 
that TDL data is propagated around the globe 24/7.  The battle-rhythm calls for real-time 
information to be available to decision makers throughout the chain of command across 
multiple AORs.  
The GWOT also changed how battle groups deploy.  Prior to 9/11, ships in a 
battle group operated in close proximity to each other, normally within line-of-sight.  
Today, a battle group's ships are spread across an entire AOR, hundreds of miles from 
each other, well beyond line-of-sight of each other.  The consequences of the new 
deployment scheme significantly impacted TDL communications.  Although sufficient 
for pre-9/11 operations, existing capabilities could not support the increase in Link 16 
message traffic volume.  Many ships, particularly large deck and command ships, were 
not equipped to handle the new TDL demands.  Ships that formerly received their Link-
16 via line-of-sight were suddenly operating well beyond line-of-sight without any means 
to receive Link 16 messages.  
Requests for assistance started pouring in with the commencement of Operation 
Enduring Freedom (OEF).  The suddenness of the campaign found deployed units unable 
to meet the new Link 16 demands.  The Link 16 communication demands varied 
depending upon a ship's mission and existing TDL capability configuration.  The new 
TDL requirements fell into two categories: add beyond line-of-sight Link 16 capability 




1.  Add Beyond Line-of-Sight Capability 
Navy ships are mission-specific; so follows their design.  Aircraft carriers do not 
have shore bombardment guns because that is not their mission.  Every system and 
capability on the ship was designed to support air wing operations.  That specificity of 
purpose is mirrored in how ships are deployed in battle groups.  A typical battle group is 
built around a high value unit (HVU), a command ship or aircraft carrier, with the 
supporting ships distributed to optimize their individual capabilities while collectively 
providing the best defense for the HVU.  A battle group presents a formidable fighting 
force by combining an optimized set of mission-specific ships. 
The GWOT changed how the Navy deploys its ships.  In the past battle groups 
deployed to specific AORs for specific durations - almost like clockwork.  Today, Navy 
ships are needed everywhere, all the time.  There is no such thing as a 'standard' six-
month deployment.  Ships are deploying in smaller Carrier Strike Groups (CSG) or 
Expeditionary Strike Groups (ESG).  As ingenious as these deployment strategies are at 
meeting the increased demand for naval presence, without a corresponding increase in 
number of ships, they have created significant C4I capability gaps.  One of the more 
significant gaps is beyond line-of-sight Link 16 communications. 
In a traditional aircraft carrier battle group (CVBG) the beyond line-of-sight Link 
16 capability resided in cruisers and destroyers which were equipped with UHF satellite 
Link 16 known as Satellite TDL J or STJ.  CVBG deployments were such that it was not 
necessary for every guided missile cruiser (CG) or guided missile destroyer (DDG) in the 
battle group to have STJ.  There were enough STJ ships to support the deploying 
CVBGs.  However, that is not the case with CSGs or ESGs.  There simply are not 
sufficient numbers of STJ-equipped CGs or DDGs to support every CSG and ESG.  
Command ships found themselves operating beyond line-of-sight from their beyond line-
of-sight Link 16 equipped supporting ships. 
2. Remotely Display Link 16 Information 
The Navy is in the process of designing its new generation warships.  Until those 
ships are deployed, the Navy will continue fighting the twenty-first century GWOT with 
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ships built for the twentieth century, blue-water cold war: ships and battle groups 
designed to take the battle to our enemy's oceans by firing cruise missile and launching 
aircraft from hundreds of miles away.  Aircraft carriers’ combat systems were designed 
for those long-range battles where aircraft and missiles strike their targets hours after they 
are launched and enemy attacks are detected hours in advance.  Under those 
circumstances, the Admiral and his staff did not need real-time data, updated to the 
millisecond, displayed in his Task Force Combat Center (TFCC).  That level of 
information was more appropriate and necessary for the ship's force so that they could 
"fight the ship" and was displayed in the ship's combat information center (CIC).   
Today's Navy sits on the enemy's doorstep.  Attacks are minutes rather than hours 
away.   Real-time tactical information is vital to the Admiral and his staff.  Whereas in 
the past the Admiral might have one of his staffers walk the 20 minutes to CIC to get an 
update – that time is a luxury he no longer enjoys.  He needs to 'see' the tactical picture.  
He needs the most current tactical information displayed on his watch floor - TFCC.  He 
needs it so that his SA is the best it can be. 
C. SOLUTION 
The first step in solving a problem is identifying the problem.  Ships at sea had 
what they deployed with when Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) began.  Gradually, 
the tactical data link deficiencies came to light; existing Link 16 networks were not 
sufficient to meet the war-driven demands, data was not moving fast enough for the 
decision-makers.  Lacking the resources and ability to correct these deficiencies, the Fleet 
articulated their needs up their chain of command (CINCPACFLT, 2002).  In accordance 
with DoD policies and regulations, they requested assistance from Commander, Fleet 
Forces Command (CFFC), their advocate for fleet personnel, training, requirements, 
maintenance, and operational issues (CFFC, 2007).  The request was forward to the 
Navy's tactical data link acquisition program office at the Space and Naval Warfare 
Command (SPAWAR), Program Management Warfare 150 (PMW 150), for Link 16 
assistance (COMSPAWARSYSCOM, 2002). 
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1. Program Offices and Programs of Record 
Acquisition program offices are the technical authorities responsible for the 
acquisition management of the Programs of Record (POR) that fall under their purview. 
Upon receiving the request for assistance from CFFC, PMW 150 investigated possible 
timely solutions that would satisfy the new needs.  Two words from the previous 
sentence warrant discussion: timely and needs.  
a. Timely 
As with most program offices, PMW 150 had a strategic plan or road map 
for ensuring its POR would continue to meet their sources sponsor's and ultimately the 
Fleets' TDL requirements.  These roadmaps are typically aligned with the Program 
Objective Memorandum (POM) cycle.   Both of the new Link 16 needs were immediate 
(weeks or months) with respect to timing whereas the PMW's roadmap dealt with a 
timeframe on the order of years (Bobrowich, 2003). 
b. Needs 
DoD acquisition is a formal and deliberate process guided by regulation, 
e.g., the JCIDS process.  The process separates validated requirements from 'wants' and 
'needs' and is designed to ensure that the right capabilities are delivered and the resources 
executed properly.  Without this rigor, chaos would quickly ensue.  Neither of the new 
Link 16 needs were validated requirements. 
After exhaustive research the program office concluded it did not have a 
POR that would provide the requested capabilities within the desired time frame 
(Fredrickson, 2003).  Its solution to adding a beyond line-of-sight Link 16 capability was 
a planned TDL system upgrade that was scheduled to deliver these capabilities in four 
years.  The program office had no plan whatsoever to deliver a remote Link 16 display 
capability.  Furthermore, without validated requirements and specific direction from their 
resource sponsor, there was nothing the program office could do to further any solutions 




Due to the uniqueness of the capabilities being delivered, DoD acquisition used to 
be a purely 'military' thing, focused exclusively on acquiring warfighter capabilities such 
as tanks, rockets, jet bombers, and guns.  That remains the case today, but in certain areas 
DoD capabilities are almost identical to civilian applications.  This is most prominent in 
the area of C4I.  
Twenty years ago practically every system on a ship was designed specifically for 
that ship.  The militarily-unique equipment was labeled with generic placards.  Walk 
through any warship today and the radio room and CIC looks like endorsements for an 
electronics superstore.  The majority of all C4I equipment is either built upon or entirely 
civilian systems.  To its credit, DoD acquisition reform recognized the value of using 
commercial-off-the-shelf technology (COTS) and has mandated COTS consideration as 
part of the analysis of alternatives (AOA) acquisition phase.  
To achieve the best possible system solution, emphasis shall be placed on 
innovation and competition. Existing commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) 
functionality and solutions drawn from a diversified range of large and 
small businesses shall be considered (DoD 5000.2, 2003). 
While the program office was endeavoring to solve the short-notice Link 16 
needs, necessity continued to drive those who initiated the request.  That necessity, 
combined with the industry's eagerness to help, produced a viable, albeit non-standard 
solution – ADSI (pronounced 'add see').   
The Air Defense System Integrator (ADSI) is an Ultra Electronics Company 
multilink-capable data link processor that satisfied both the beyond line-of-sight Link 16 
and the remote display needs.  ADSIs are used by the US Air Force and Army units 
deployed in support of Operations Enduring and Iraqi Freedom.  Word-of-mouth among 
the tactical datalink community brought ADSI to the attention of Navy operators, who 
seeing this as the only means of obtaining the desired capabilities, acquired units directly 
from Ultra Electronics.  
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Fighting the GWOT has put tremendous strain upon the entire DoD acquisition 
system.  Warfighters' request for more and better capabilities forced dramatic changes in 
the fielding of capabilities, particularly in the area of tactical datalinks, the end result of 
which was the non-standard acquisition of C4I capabilities.  Although the non-standard 
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IV. IMPACTS OF NON-STANDARD ACQUISITION OF COTS C41 
SYSTEMS 
A. BACKGROUND 
The success of the initial ADSIs' installation had a tremendous and immediate 
impact upon the Navy shipboard TDL community.  For less than $120K, a ship could 
achieve the desired TDL capabilities in an unprecedented time-frame (Ture, 2007).  News 
of the ADSIs' success drew significant attention from the Link 16-deprived large-deck 
command ships and aircraft carriers.  The TDL genie was "out of the bottle." 
As the number of ships supporting the GWOT grew, so followed the proliferation 
of ADSIs.  In order to participate in the established AOR communication architecture, 
incoming battle groups demanded the same capabilities as their successful outgoing 
predecessors (USS CORONADO, 2003).  In less than three years, five ADSIs had been 
purchased – outside the formal acquisition process and unbeknownst to the TDL program 
office.   
News of operational impact of the few fielded units spread throughout the Navy 
TDL community.  Although the benefits of the having an ADSI were obvious, acquiring 
one directly from the manufacturer was not an option for all.  Some ships lacked the 
funds to purchase the units, while others thought it the responsibility of Navy acquisition 
to deliver the needed capabilities.  The end results were the same – a new round of 
requests for assistance was sent up the chain of command.   
Unlike the vague request from 18 months prior, these requests were very specific 
often asking for ADSI by name (COMPACFLT, 2004).  Where the earlier request lacked 
specific justification for the wanted the capabilities, the impact of the fielded ADSIs 
during the subsequent 18 months made a compelling case for acquiring these capabilities.  
ADSI had proven itself and requests for the additional units continued to grow.  
Over the course of 12 months, the program office received six formal requests for 
ADSI or ADSI-like capabilities.  That number of request over a relatively short period of 
time highlighted the Link 16 redisplay and BLOS deficiencies being felt across a 
significant segment of the Fleet.  The requests were vetted through the proper channels, 
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as before, but this time they were validated by CFFC (COMFLTFORCOM, 2004) and 
forwarded to OPNAV, who in turn directed the program office to develop a strategy to 
solve the deficiencies (CNO, October 2004).  
There is more to fielding new C4I capabilities than the technology. In some 
respects technology maturation could be considered the easiest part.  The difficulties arise 
due to the complexities associated with fielding new capabilities to a host of different 
ships, each with their unique set of integration and scheduling challenges, all of which is 
further complicated by resource constraints (Nguyen, 2006).  
The specific capabilities being requested were not beyond the program office's 
conceptual grasp.  They were, in fact, part of a planed evolution or growth of C4I 
capabilities.  The problem, if that is the proper characterization, was a matter of time 
lines, a question of when the program office planned to field the capabilities.  The 
program office had a roadmap for fielding new capabilities; it was their tactical data link 
management plan (TDLMP).  The requested capabilities were in the TDLMP, programs 
such as: the Joint Command and Control (JC2), Next Generation Command and Control 
Processor (NGC2P), Joint Information Control Officer (JICO) Support System (JSS), 
Global Command and Control System (GCCS), and the Common Link Integration 
Processor (CLIP).   The TDL requirements created by the GWOT communication 
demands called for the immediate fielding of these capabilities. Unfortunately, the 
capabilities were not scheduled to be fielded for another four to six years (CNO, May 
2004).   
The program office, looking outside traditional acquisition, put forward an 
ingenious proposal; field ADSI as an interim solution to their PORs.  OPNAV concurred 
with the proposal and directed the program office to support the fielding of 30 ADSIs, to 
be treated as POR but without formal POR status. The development and subsequent 






The impact of the ADSIs' fielding on the warfighter was immediate and very 
positive.  Their installations were not complex, intrusive, time-consuming, or with 
significant impact upon existing systems.  The little training that was required was 
provided during their installations.  In a matter of days, a ship's TDL capabilities were 
improved exponentially.  The TDL information that provided the Admiral's SA eclipsed 
all previously available data.  The warfighter was getting the information that he needed, 
when he needed it.   
C. PROGRAMS OF RECORD 
The nature of the ADSIs "programmatic" status was the driving factor with 
respect to the impact of their fielding and support upon the program office's PORs.  
OPNAV was very specific in its directions to the program office; "ADSI is not a funded 
program" but rather a Navy "system" with the program office acting as the "Project 
Office responsible for the centrally-funded ADSI systems (CNO, October 2004)."  
Adhering to OPNAV's direction to support 30 unfunded ADSIs resulted in the program 
office having to take the associated cost "out of hide."  In today's austere acquisition 
budgetary environment there are not much, if any, extra monies.  The program office's 
"hide" was precariously thin due to supporting existing PORs so the burden of supporting 
the 30 ADSIs did significantly impact the existing PORs. 
1. Impact on Existing Programs of Record  
Because the ADSIs were merely a Navy "system," the funds required to support 
them would have to come from the program office's existing PORs (NGC2P, CDLMS 
and GCCS).  The costs to support the fielding of the 30 ADSIs (new installations 
~$305K, as well as upgrading previously-fielded systems ~$140K), were not trivial 
(PMW 150, 2004).  Unlike the handful of previously Fleet-installed ADSIs; which were 
performed without acquisition rigor; life-cycle support, or formal training, the costs to 
properly upgrade, field, and support the 30 ADSI is estimated to be on the order of 
~$15M (PMW 150, 2004).  The impact of the reallocation of resources on the POR was 







Table 1.   Estimated ADSI funding requirement summary (After PMW 150, 2004). 
 
The reallocation of PORs funds, particularly the Operations and Maintenance 
Navy (OMN), hindered the program office's ability to perform its primary Fleet support 
activities: on-site tech assist, user reported software trouble report (TRs) fixes, and help 
desk/web-site support for the affected POR.  Software is a major component of the 
affected PORs, making technical assists and responding to TRs routine and unavoidable 
matters of doing business.  Each POR has multiple software versions in use throughout 
the Fleet which require periodic updates and associated on-site tech assists for installation 
and training.  Another unavoidable aspect of the software updates is the resulting new-
software-generated TRs.  Each TR has to be vetted, validated (not operator error or other 
explainable reason), and prioritized (1-4, high to low impact) for correction.  A reduction 
in available OMN funds equates to fewer on-site tech assist, fewer TR fixes (limited to 
Priority 1), and reduced help desk/web-site support for the associated PORs (PMW 150, 
2004).   
2. Impact on Future Programs of Record 
Future PORs were also impacted by the fielding of 30 non-POR ADSIs.  Because 
C4I capabilities, particularly TDLs, field in an evolutionary manner, future capabilities 
are normally built upon previous or existing systems.  Reductions in near-term funding 
invariably delay development and delivery of future capabilities.  The TRs deferred due 
to lack of funds did not "go away," they needed to be fixed, and barring the highly 
unlikely receipt of budget plus-ups, the funds to fix the deferred TRs would come from  
 
 
ESTIMATED ADSI FUNDING REQUIREMENT SUMMARY 
  FY 05 FY 06 FY 07 FY 08 FY 09 
# of Upgrades 6 6 0 0 0 
# of New Installs* 5 5 6 0 0 
Required OMN ~$1,600K ~$2,340K ~$1,900K ~$1,700K ~$1,400K 
Required OPN ~$2,365K ~$1,525K ~$1,835K $0 $0 
Total ~$3,965k ~$3,865K ~$3,735K ~$1,700K ~$1,400K 
* Does not included 2 previously-installed units
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the program office's budget.  As there is no budgetary slop or cushion, the funds are 
pulled from existing PORs, perpetuating POR funding short-falls, which in turn result in 
the delayed fielding of needed capabilities.   
Unlike the detrimental impact on existing PORs, the impact of the reallocation of 
funds on future PORs had some beneficial aspects.  The attention gained and interest 
generated in meeting the Fleet's demand for Link 16 redisplay and BLOS capabilities put 
the importance of TDLs center-stage in OPNAV.  Additionally, having the ADSIs fill the 
capability gap provided time for capability maturation of the PORs scheduled to replace 
them – JC2, NGC2P and CLIP.   
Although beneficial to the warfighter, the non-standard acquisition of C4I system 
was detrimental to existing PORs because of the reallocation of funds.  Due to the non-
POR status of the non-standard C4I system, funding to support them was taken from 
existing formal PORs.  Given the detrimental affects of the reallocation, analysis of 
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V. ANALYSIS OF PREVENTING REOCCURRENCE AND 
POTENTIAL FOR APPLICATION TO OTHER C4I PROGRAMS 
A. BACKGROUND 
In spite of volumes of acquisition regulations, instructions, directives and 
guidance, non-standard acquisition occurred.  The preceding chapter summarized the 
circumstances which precipitated the proliferation and subsequent non-standard 
acquisition of a COTS C4I system.  With an understanding of those circumstances, an 
analysis of preventing future occurrences would be of interest, particularly with respect to 
applicability to other C4I programs. 
B. PREVENTION 
Prevention is not simply a matter of answering the question; "how could this have 
been prevented?"  That is certainly an important question, but there is an equally 
important question; "was it preventable?"  Given the number, size, and cost required to 
deliver capabilities to the warfighter, DoD acquisition is necessarily very process-
oriented, allowing little room for interpretation.  Understanding how the processes were 
followed (or not) as well as the impact of the GWOT on the process, will answer both 
prevention questions.  
1. Process Compliance 
The Navy has been successfully deploying its forces for over a century.  That 
success is directly attributable to a well-defined process that ensures sailors have the 
required capabilities.  That process, the defense acquisition system, is the means by 
which requirements, resources, and delivery of capabilities are managed.   Previous 
chapters defined the numerous participants in and the multiple layers of the requirements 
generation process.  In spite of those requirements, non-standard acquisition still 





The GWOT put tremendous TDL demands on deployed ships.  Unable to 
meet these demands, various battle group staffs, following the proper channels and 
procedures, requested assistance from their chain of command (C7F, CPF to CFFC).  
Acknowledging the stream of TDL demands and the necessity for the capability, CFFC 
validated and forwarded the request to the Navy's requirements office, OPNAV N6.  
Even though they purchased a few units outside of proper acquisition 
channels, overall, the Fleet had basically complied with the process. 
b. Navy Requirements Office 
Upon receiving the CFFC-validated request, the Navy's requirements and 
resources office, OPNAV, directed the responsible program office, SPAWAR PMW 150, 
to develop a strategy to meet the validated requirements.   
OPNAV had complied with the process. 
c. Program Office 
By definition, program offices manage PORs that have defined 
capabilities and schedules.  Program Offices are not designed, resourced, or configured to 
meet short-notice requests.  Their only viable course of action in response to OPNAV's 
direction was to look to their PORs for possible solutions.  
The program office had products under development that would 
eventually provide the requested capabilities; unfortunately their fielding schedules did 
not support the immediate requirements.  The only option for delivering the desired 
capabilities in the time required was to field a proven system, the ADSI.  Accordingly, 
the program office developed an ADSI fielding strategy using funds from existing PORs.    
The ADSI was the only proven system able to meet the fielding schedule.  
In spite of not being a POR, and at OPNAV's direction, the ADSIs were fielded.  The 
program office had complied with the process.    
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Starting with the initial request and going up the Navy acquisition chain of 
command, proper procedures and processes were followed.  With the exception of the 
few individual ships that purchased the units commercially, all parties complied with 
defense acquisition system guidance.  
2. Options 
The GWOT added an appropriate sense of urgency to battlefield request.  
Warfighters were not requesting capabilities because they merely wanted something new; 
they were engaged in combat and critically needed the capability.  The acquisition system 
responded with an array of programs to help meet emerging warfighter requirements: 
ATD, ACTD, WRAP, RDC, JRAC, and RCIP.    
To the uninitiated, the above programs would seem to offer an alternate path to 
ADSI for fielding the desired TDL capabilities.  Their names alone make them seem 
viable candidates begging the questions, "did the program office even consider them?  
Could they have provided the desired capabilities sooner or cheaper?"   
Close examination reveals that the listed programs are designed to solve particular 
acquisition challenges, each having very specific criteria.  For example; ATDs are used to 
demonstrate technical maturity – ADSI was mature, ACTDs evaluate military utility – 
ADSI was already in use by the military, and JRACs are designed to counter new or 
emerging battlefield threats, which was not the case with the TDL requirements.  
Unfortunately, the requested TDL capabilities did not meet any of the accelerated 
acquisition programs criteria.  
The ADSIs were fielded as an interim solution for meeting the TDL requirements. 
Given the requested capabilities, timeline, and available resources, there was no better 
solution, POR or otherwise.  Although DoD acquisition has an array of programs 
designed to help speed delivery of capability, due to a range of reasons, from the unique 
capability request to the availability of an existing solution, none of the DoD accelerated 
fielding programs were applicable.  The non-standard acquisition of ADSI was the best 
solution to meet the warfighter requirements.  The only way to have prevented the non-
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standard acquisition would have been to leave the validated warfighter requirement 
unfilled.  That not being an option, the fielding of the ADSIs was not preventable.  
C. REOCCURRENCE  
Lessons learned, "knowledge or understanding gained by experience," is a 
hallmark of military operations (GAO, 2001).  Prior to embarking on deployment, a 
major exercise, or maneuvers, all are admonished to read the "lessons learned" from 
previous efforts in order to understand the potential challenges and corresponding 
mitigation options.  Likewise, upon returning from operations, the same folks are directed 
to write their "lessons learned" for the benefit of those who will follow.  Unfortunately, in 
many cases, most lessons are actually lessons "relearned."  Preventing the reoccurrence 
of non-standard acquisition is a matter of lessons learned.  Can the DoD acquisition 
system learn from experience and in particular, can it learn from this particular lesson?  
1. Successes 
The DoD acquisition system is unique.  It has neither a civilian counterpart nor a 
corporate equivalent.  The system is immense in terms of size, scope of responsibility, 
complexity, expenditures, and number of employees.  Yet, in spite of those significant 
challenges, the greater DoD acquisition system has demonstrated an ability to learn.   
a. Acquisition Reform 
Reform is the "improvement or amendment of what is wrong, corrupt, or 
unsatisfactory (Webster, 2002)."  DoD acquisition has been in a process of reform for 
over 30 years.  The establishment of the Defense Acquisition University was the result of 
lessons learned – the need for professional acquisition corps (Garcia et al, 1997).  The 
substantial reform efforts of Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz clearly demonstrate 





b. Response to GWOT  
The most recent example of DoD acquisition adapting or learning is its 
response to the GWOT's acquisition challenges.  Today's enemy is resourceful and crafty.  
His tactics are constantly evolving as are his weapons and methods.  Acknowledging the 
traditional acquisition processes could not deliver the required capabilities fast enough, 
the acquisition system responded with rapid capability fielding programs such as JCTD 
and JRAC.  This responsiveness clearly demonstrates that the acquisition community is 
learning from previous experiences.     
2. Challenges 
The requested TDL capabilities were not unreasonable or extraordinary.  They 
were listed in the JTDLMP and the Navy's tactical datalink roadmap.  The problem was 
one of timing.  The requested capabilities fielding's were years away.    
a. Anticipation 
It is an unrealistic expectation to be prepared for the unknown.  The 
surprise attacks of September 11th caught the world off guard.  That is the very nature of 
surprises, they occur suddenly and without warning.  The attacks were unprecedented, the 
first of their kind and completely unanticipated.    
b. Execution 
The attacks of September 11th caught the DoD acquisition community off 
guard as well.  Prosecuting the GWOT put a tremendous strain on DoD resources which 
impacted the acquisition system.  Requests for capabilities poured in while resources 
remain unchanged.   Although the desired TDL capabilities were "in the POR pipe line," 
delivering them early was not possible.   
The warfighters' response to the surprise attacks was the proper 





forwarded to the program office for resolution.  The program office was charged with and 
subsequently provided a solution, albeit a non-standard solution, to the unanticipated 
requirements.  
In the process of providing the solution, the program office encountered 
numerous difficulties: an increase in requirements without corresponding increase in 
resources, inability to plan for the unexpected, inflexibility of long-range plans and 
roadmaps, and the rigidity of the acquisition system.  Although these difficulties provided 
valuable "insight," they fell short of having the relevance of lessons learned as they 
simply confirmed the obvious; one can not prepare for the unknown. 
3. Lessons Learned 
Preventing reoccurrence is a matter of not repeating the same act, in other words, 
to learn the lesson.  The DoD acquisition system is not stagnant, it evolves and reforms 
itself.    The reforms are driven to make the system better and more responsive in meeting 
warfighter needs.    
A key component of reform is improving upon mistakes, thereby benefiting from 
lessons learned.  The non-standard acquisition of ADSIs produced some meaningful 
lessons.   
a. DoD Acquisition System 
In this post 9/11 era, the DoD acquisition system must continue to be 
responsive and help push that responsiveness to the lowest echelon possible.  The 
services have to support that responsiveness by providing supplemental funding to 
support the immediate fielding of required capabilities.   
Furthermore, the acquisition community must learn how to deliver 
capabilities sooner, particularly in the C4I arena.  The slowness to field has been the 
driving force behind acquisition reform for over 30 years, yet capabilities are still taking 
5 to 10 years to field; 5 to 10 years represents a generation (or two) of C4I technology 




was already proven.  The ADSIs were fielded because the comparable PORs were not 
scheduled to be delivered for another four to six years.  The acquisition system was too 
slow. 
b. Community Relationships 
In order to meet short-notice warfighter requirements, communication 
across the acquisition community will have to improve significantly.  Time, more so then 
technology, is the limiting factor.  No longer can the warfighter submit a request and 
hope it gets the proper funding and support, the process is too slow.  The acquisition 
system needs a closer relationship with its customers.   
Program offices need to engage the warfighter as their technical subject 
matter experts, eager for conversation and idea exchange with the operators.  Gone 
should be the days of the program offices being faceless entities that deliver antiquated 
gear that the Fleet no longer wants.  Technology growth demands continuous two-way 
conversation if acquisition is to deliver the right capabilities.  The more the acquisition 
community understands the warfighter, the better they will be able to meet his needs.  
Likewise, the more the warfighter understands the acquisition process, the better 
participant he will be. 
The TDL genie is "out of the bottle."  As long as the warfighters' 
requirements remain unfilled and the technology easy and relatively cheap to acquire, 
complete elimination of non-standard C4I acquisition is not realistic.  However, a 
significant reduction in reoccurrence is possible provided the acquisition community 
learns this lesson.     Acquisition reform is making great strides.  Secretary Wolfowitz's 
goal to "create an acquisition policy environment that fosters efficiency, flexibility, 
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VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
Non-standard acquisition does not just happen.  The DoD acquisition system is 
regulation-guided and process-driven.  Yet in spite of layers of regulations and volumes 
of directives, non-standard acquisition of a C4I system occurred, the consequence of 
which was the reprioritization of program office funds.  The corresponding reallocation 
of resources negatively impacted existing programs of record. 
The non-standard acquisition was not a deliberate affront to the acquisition 
system, but rather a manifestation of the warfighters' frustration with delays in acquiring 
necessary capabilities.  Fighting the GWOT brought unanticipated TDL communication 
demands that forced warfighters do as they have done throughout history, adapt, 
improvise, and overcome.  Although the initial ADSIs were purchased directly from the 
manufacturer and outside formal acquisition, they proved effective and precipitated the 
demand and subsequent legitimate acquisition of the additional units that satisfied vital 
warfighter requirements.  From the warfighter's perspective, the non-standard acquisition 
of the C4I technology was acquisition reform at work – "giving the warfighter what he 
needs when he needed it." 
The GWOT's impact on the DoD acquisition system has been profound, touching 
practically every aspect of acquisition from the requirements generation process to 
resourcing.  Whereas prior to 9/11 acquisition reform was a goal, it is now a forced 
reality.  DoD acquisition is quickly transforming to meet the warfighters' needs.  
Innovative programs such as JCTDs, WRAPs, the JRAC, and to a lesser degree the non-
standard acquisition of the ADSIs, are the most recent examples of how acquisition is 
becoming "more efficient, flexible, creative, and innovative." 
Exuberance aside, DoD acquisition system is still facing significant challenges.  
The non-standard C4I acquisition forced the program office into a non-traditional role of 
developing a solution to a short-notice requirement. Although the eventual solution 
satisfied the requirements, it did so at the expense of other programs.  The “robbing Peter  
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to pay Paul” acquisition under the guise of fighting the GWOT is not sustainable, 
jeopardizes proper systems acquisition, and must, to the greatest extent possible, be 
prevented. 
The key to preventing or minimizing reoccurrences of non-standard C4I 
acquisition is to learn the lessons from this occurrence.  One of the most important 
lessons learned is the vital role communication plays across the acquisition community of 
interest.   
The program office had a plan to deliver the desired capabilities.  The plan was 
the product of the acquisition's top-down requirements process.  Unfortunately, the plan's 
timeline did not support the short-notice requirements and resulted in the non-standard 
acquisition of C4I capabilities.  Had there been more communication between the 
program office and the warfighter, the program office might have been able to adjust 
their POR delivery during the 18 months the Fleet tried to solve the problem on their 
own.   Greater communication could have precipitated dialogue between the program 
office and its resource sponsor, giving them more time to explore additional funding. 
Whether the program office could have delivered the capability sooner is mute, as 
they were never given the opportunity.  In retrospect, it is doubtful that the program 
office could have accelerated their PORs to meet the delivery schedule, but the lesson 
remains valid: warfighter demands will continue and having a better understanding of 
them sooner will greatly benefit both the program office and the warfighter. 
Over the past five years, the DoD acquisition system has made significant strides 
in providing the warfighter "what he needed when he needed it."  DoD reform efforts are 
starting to have an impact.  The GWOT has changed the way that we go to war and how 
we field capabilities in support of the warfighter.  Provided the lessons are truly learned, 
the likelihood of a reoccurrence of the non-standard C4I acquisition of equal magnitude 





B.  RECOMMENDATIONS 
The growth of C4I technology is outpacing the DoD acquisition process.  In order 
for the warfighters to maintain C4I battle-space dominance, the acquisition system must 
field C4I capabilities quicker.  As intimidating as the task sounds, quicker fielding of C4I 
capabilities is achievable.  No special commissions, panels of experts, or organizational 
shake-ups are necessary.  The eloquence of the solutions lies in their simplicity:  optimize 
existing regulations and directives that guide the process and foster greater 
warfighter/operator involvement. 
1. Process Optimization          
Slowness to field is not a C4I-unique acquisition problem.  Due to the number, 
cost, and complexity of the capabilities ultimately delivered; DoD acquisition is large, 
cumbersome, and often perceived as overly slow.  The acquisition system has been 
grappling with these challenges for years, the result of which being the various reform 
initiatives.  The current DoD, CJCS, and DoN acquisition directives and regulations 
provide numerous paths to quicker fielding.  Mandatory consideration of COTS and NDI 
capabilities is a good example of how the process fosters speed of fielding.  Programs 
such as ACTD, RCIP, and the JRAC process are further evidence of how acquisition is 
trying to deliver warfighter capability more quickly.   
If a goal of acquisition reform is to reduce the time required to field a capability,  
why then, despite procedures and programs along those lines, does slowness to field 
persist: in a word bureaucracy.  The bureaucratic burden endemic to any large 
government organization impedes quicker fielding.  
The acquisition process is a seemingly countless series of necessary steps, without 
which the process would fall apart.  As vital as these steps are, unless expeditiously 
executed, they easily become an impediment to the process.  The acquisition bureaucracy 
hinders any chance of expediency.  Steps that should take days or weeks, end up taking 
months or longer, with each delay being propagated to following steps.  The main cause 
of the delay is briefs: information briefs, decision briefs, program status briefs, budget 
briefs, milestone briefs, etc.  As a rule, each brief requires supporting briefs which spawn 
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multiple iterations as they move up the chain of command and each of those brief 
requiring a pre-brief meeting.  The subsequent delayed decisions invariably impact 
production which inevitably delays delivery of the required capability. 
The entire acquisition community needs to be more aggressive as they advance 
through the necessary steps to fielding a capability.  Decisions should be delegated to the 
lowest practical level, thereby reducing the number of briefings and approval "Inboxes."   
Providing the warfighters the capabilities they need when they need is them is the 
responsibility of the acquisition community.   Every effort should be taken to exploit the 
numerous speed-to-fielding programs to do so. 
2. Warfighter Involvement 
Warfighter feedback is a key acquisition reform driver.  If acquisition is to meet 
warfighter demands, particularly in the area of C4I, it can no longer be a faceless 
organization - it needs to engage the customer.  Greater warfighter involvement in the 
acquisition process helps the acquisition community as well as the warfighter.  
Warfighter involvement will help ensure the right capability is being fielded.  
Additionally, it will help reduce non-standard acquisition and improve the speed of 
capability delivery. 
The key component of the warfighters' involvement is dialogue; dialogue between 
the producers and the users.  This dialogue is crucial to C4I programs where technology 
changes are such that a capability requested could be at risk of not being sufficient by the 
time it is fielded.  Persistent dialogue over the course of a capabilities' development 
would help ensure the fielded capability meets the warfighters' needs.  Currently, the 
warfighter does not effectively participate in the acquisition process after his initial 
requirements are received. 
Warfighter involvement, particularly at the program office level, would go a long 
way in reducing non-standard acquisition and correspondingly inefficient expenditures of 
precious resources.   No or poor communication between the warfighter and the program 
office could precipitate non-standard acquisition.  In the case of the ADSIs, had the 
warfighters communicated their need and impending purchase of commercial capabilities 
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to the program office, the program office might have been able to help with the 
acquisition and, more importantly, become aware of the much-needed TDL capabilities.   
As that dialogue did not exist, the program office did not learn of the need for 18 months; 
18 months that could have been spent developing a solution.  
Greater warfighter involvement does not imply abandonment of formal 
acquisition procedures.  Warfighter involvement forges a partnership of sorts that 
encourages collaboration throughout the entire acquisition process, rather than just the 
front end.   The acquisition community can help by engaging the warfighter in dialogue 
through Fleet briefings, road shows of sorts, which communicate where the program 
office is heading, both near and long-term, thereby giving the Fleet a chance to provide 
their input. 
C.  AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
The DoD acquisition system is in a persistent state of "reform."  Why, in spite of 
years of reform and an array of "acceleration" programs, does DoD acquisition continue 
to struggle to meet warfighter needs?  The numerous reform efforts acknowledge the 
necessity for improvement and demonstrate the drive to make the process better.  After 
30 years of acquisition reform, perhaps the answer is not more reform, but rather better 
execution.  Acquisition needs to stop reforming and start getting better.   
Further research into two related areas, enforcement of existing governance and 
acquisition rigor, would be of interest and beneficial to the acquisition community. 
1. Enforcement 
Acquisition governance; the directives, regulations, and guidance, that describes 
how acquisition is supposed to work, does not provide significant enforcement 
mechanisms.  Non-standard acquisition occurs because the existing system, by not 
preventing it, allows it.   An examination of possible acquisition enforcements would be 




2. Acquisition Rigor 
Providing capabilities to the entire DoD is a monumental task requiring a very 
large work force and budget.  Proper management of the acquisition workforce and 
execution of budgets necessitate volumes of rules and regulations.  Without procedures 
and guidance, the DoD acquisition system would fall into chaos.  The amount of reform 
to date might suggest the fall has begun.  Acquisition rigor, the scrupulous adherence to 
process, would reduce unnecessary bureaucracy thereby speeding delivery of needed 
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